Milsurp After Hours

One of the oft stated reasons that the P1907 bayonet was developed after the introduction of the P1903 was the question of length.

The sudden loss of 5 inches of reach was reportedly troubling to the troops and the British Army obligingly developed a longer bayonet.

Now the replacement of the Martini-Henry rifle with the Lee-Metford resulted in a much greater loss of reach. Both rifles are around the 49 inch mark and yet blades on bayonets for the MH ranged from 17 inches (the modified P1853) to 18 inches (the P1887 specifically developed for the MH) to 22.8 inches (P1860). The Lee rifles on the other hand had only the 12 inch P1888. So overall length went from a minimum 66 inches/maximum 72 inches to 61 inches.

Now I don't imagine soldiers in 1889 were too much different to soldiers in 1903. So was there any objection to the loss of length in 1889 ? Or was the British Military simply more enlightened by 1903 ?

Woftam, I remember a thread about the shortened Indian P07s. It seemed the concensus that the P03 was replaced with the P07 because of the comparitive OAL to rifles of other countries. This may be more psychological than practical, but still accounts for something. Another reason given was that it was felt a short sword was more practical than a long knife (I question this).

It seems the Indians felt the P03's length was handier as a bayonet and stuck to the 12" length steadfastly.

One thing not covered was the science of bayonet use as it applied to the era. Bottom line is I don't know and wonder if anyone can provide a definative answer...hope so.

Happy New Year, Brad

I thought the reason they wanted the overall length back was that the SMLE with 1903 was to short for the infantry to defend themselves against mounted troops.

"...to defend themselves against mounted troops..." Which is why you poke the horse. Or whack it across the nose with the butt.

The secondary purpose of there ever being a bayonet in the first place. Replaced the PBI's sword and kept them as pikemen.

"..."...to defend themselves against mounted troops..." Which is why you poke the horse. Or whack it across the nose with the butt. ..."

Surely, the aim is to go for the rider's crotch, If you get them, they're incapacitated, if you miss above or to one side, they are still wounded and even if you don't injure them, the rider still tends to be made somewhat 'discouraged' (although, shooting the b*gg*rs out of the saddle is still the best option).

Tom

I don't offer this as a reason but merely make the observation that two '07s stuck into the ground and with a third one as a cross piece make an excellent rig for boiling a small 'billy' for a brew up.

Given the great thoroughness with which British small arms were developed at the time (compared to today's procurement disasters...), there are certain to have been cast-iron reasons for the decisions around each of the bayonets. The reasons would have been centred around changes in military technology and tactics, but also on regional variations in requirement. In this case, the British Army and the Indian Army probably had different requirements at the time.

I don't know, but lets surmise the "Indians" main operational engagement was against native soldiers (eg Pathans) who fought with single-shot muskets and a variety of swords and spears. The Indians may have therefore needed a rifle & bayonet combination that was handy in one-on-one combat - hence the preference for the 1903 and then the India pattern shortened '07.

The British Army, by contrast, had recent experience in the Boer War of fighting both mounted troops (as mentioned above) but also - more importantly - entrenched troops. Bayoneting a man whose chest is actually below your own feet level (as when you standing on the parapet of his trench) would require a long rifle & bayonet.

Experience in WW1 would probably reinforce the above choices - the Indian Army largely fought in the Middle East, the British Army on the western front. The adoption of the No4 and spike bayonet in the 1930s was probably a realisation that trench warfare would not re-occur, but that infantry would be fighting on the surface in support of mobile operations.